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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARLEN W. BROWN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HARRY HEATHMAN, INC., HARRY 
HEATHMAN doing business as 
Heathman Investment Company and 
Heathman Properties, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
CASE NO. 20885 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant herewith submits to this Court the 
following issues for disposition upon this appeal: 
1. Whether the District Court Judge's findings were in 
accordance with the evidence. The findings were: 
A. That Defendants did not knowingly make false 
statements to Plaintiff regarding the character of the automobile 
purchased and did not act fraudulently to induce Plaintiff to 
purchase the automobile; 
B. That Defendants did not act with scienter; 
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C. That Defendants did not commit actual acts of fraud 
or any deceptive act or practice which would support recission of 
the purchase and sale contract. 
2. Whether the District Court Judge failed to make findings 
on whether the Defendants breached the purchase and sale contract. 
3. Whether the District Court Judge committed error in 
failing to award Plaintiff the value of the trade-in vehicle which 
was retained by Defendantsf or some portion of the value; 
4. Whether the District Court Judge committed error at 
trialf over the objections of Plaintiff's counsel, in permitting 
counsel for the Defendants to read into evidence portions of the 
transcript of the deposition of Robert H. Posey. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Plaintiff instituted this action against Defendants on 
October 22, 1979. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had made 
material misrepresentations of fact to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff 
had justifiably relied upon the misrepresentations in entering into 
a contract with Defendants. Plaintiff further alleged that 
Defendants failed to perform the terms of the contract. The 
contract concerned Plaintiff's purchase of a 1979 Buick Regal 
automobile from Defendants, and the trade-in by Plaintiff of a 1978 
Chevrolet truck. Defendants filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff. 
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UIS2QSUIQSL1S ,T,m ^ QHER CQqRT? 
The case was tried without a jury before Judge J. Robert 
Bullock on May 13f 1985. On August 13f 1985, the Judge ruled that 
Defendants1 counterclaim was dismissed for failure to prosecute and 
that Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for no cause of action.' 
Appellant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court 
reversed and judgment entered in his favor on the issues of fraud, 
breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. 
STATfiMElfi: QP ,FACTS 
On September 21f 1979f Plaintiff negotiated with Defendants 
for the purchase of a new car. Defendants represented, in writing 
and orally, that a 1979 Buick Regal automobile was new. Plaintiff 
executed Defendants' VEHICLE BUYER'S ORDER and a CONSUMER CREDIT 
CONTRACT, both of which indicated in writing that the car was a new 
vehicle. Defendants' charged Plaintiff the new-car sticker price 
for the automobile. As a down payment, Plaintiff traded in his 1978 
Chevrolet truck which, at the time, was only a year old. 
The day after Plaintiff had taken delivery of the car, he 
discovered that the car was used and had in excess of 11,000 miles 
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on it. Plaintiff endeavored to return the vehicle. Defendants1 
indicated that they would "make it right" with him, although they 
took no action to do so. Plaintiff refused to pay the balance owed 
on the car and Defendants' repossessed it. 
Upon Defendants' repossession of the Buick, they also 
refused to return Plaintiff's trade-in vehicle, or to refund the 
value thereof ($4,473.64) or any portion of the value. 
Consequently, Plaintiff was without both the vehicle he had 
purchased as a "new" vehicle and the vehicle he had traded in. 
SUMMARY QF ABGUMEMI 
The District Court committed error in the following 
respects: 
First, it ruled that Plaintiff failed to establish a cause 
of action for fraud against the Defendants. To the contrary, 
Plaintiff's evidence showed that Defendants knowingly or recklessly 
made oral and written misrepresentations of fact for the purpose of 
inducing Plaintiff to rely thereon. Plaintiff reasonably relied on 
Defendant's misrepresentations and was damaged as a result. 
The District Court's ruling is in part based on deposition 
testimony which was erroneously admitted into evidence in the 
absence of an adequate showing of witness unavailability, as 
required by the Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah case law. 
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Second, it failed to make any finding concerning Plaintiff's 
cause of action for breach of contract, as required by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah case law. 
Third, it failed to make any finding concerning the unjust 
enrichment of Defendants concerning their repossession of the 
vehicle purchased by Plaintiff. 
Based upon these errors, the District Court's ruling in the 
case should be reversed. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT HARRY HEATHMAN, INC. IS 
NOT LIABLE FOR FRAUD IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE. 
All of the elements of fraud were substantiated with 
evidence offered by Mr. Brown at trial. Defendants did not appear 
in person although their attorney attended the trial. They did not 
call any witnesses. They offered only the deposition testimony of 
one Robert Posey, Heathman's salesman, and the testimony was 
admitted into evidence over the strong objection of Plaintiff's 
counsel. 
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A. REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD 
In Utah a finding of fraud requires: 
. . • a showing of a false representation of an existing 
material fact, made knowingly or recklessly for the purpos 
of inducing reliance thereon upon which plaintiff reasonab 
relies to his detriment. Sugarhouse Finance Company v ^ 
Anderson. Utah, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1980). 
Similarly, the elements of a cause of action for fraud are 
outlined in Taylor v.. Gasor, Inc., Utah, 607 P.2d 292, 294 (1980) 
as follows: 
A finding of fraud must be based on the existence of all i 
essential elements, i.e., the making of a false 
representation concerning a presently existing material fa< 
which the representator either knew to be false or made 
recklessly without sufficient knowledge, or the omission o 
a material fact when there is a duty to disclose, for the 
purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party, 
with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to 
that party. 
See also Horton v.. Horton, Utah 695 P.2d 102 (1984) and Dugan v. 
Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 1239 (1980). 
B. HARRY HEATHMAN, INC. MADE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS TO 
HARLEN BROWN CONCERNING A PRESENTLY EXISTING MATERIAL FACT 
A cause of action for fraud involves a misrepresentation o 
an existing material fact. Sugarhouse Finance Company.v^_.Anderson 
610 P.2d at 1373; Taylor v. Gasor, Inc. 607 P.2d at 294. 
Harry Heathman, Inc. made oral and written representations 
to Harlen Brown that the 1979 Buick Regal they offered to sell him 
was "new." The oral representations were made on September 12, 19 
by Robert H. Posey, the authorized agent of the Defendant who was 
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negotiating the sale on Defendant's behalf. (Record at 7). 
Defendant made two separate written representations that the 1979 
Buick Regal was a new vehicle. The Vehicle Buyer's Order 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 at trial) and Consumer Credit Contract 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 at trial), prepared and completed by 
Heathman's representativef both indicate that the 1979 Buick Regal 
was new. Both forms contained boxes which could be checked to 
indicate that the car was either "NEW" or "USED." On both forms, 
Heathman's representative checked the boxes indicating that the 1979 
Buick Regal was "NEW." 
In determining whether or not a fact is material, the 
Supreme Court of Kansas in Timi .v.. Prescott_State_Bankf 553 P.2d 
315f 325f 220 Kan. 377 (1976) stated as follows: 
A fact is material if it is one to which a reasonable person 
would attach importance in determining his choice of action 
in the transaction involved. (Citations omitted). 
The fact that a car is new or used is indeed a fact to which 
reasonable people would attach importance in considering a purchase. 
It is often the first factor a buyer would consider. 
The oral and written representations made by Harry Heathman, 
Inc. to Harlen Brown concern the existence of a material fact; i.e., 
the new or used status of an automobile. The representation is not 
in the nature of a promise of future action, judgment, intention, 
prediction or conjecture which would work to defeat a cause of 
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action for fraud. The statement made concerned one of the most 
essential elements of the sales transaction. 
In firfifin-,Ixees-.Entfirpxi5fi5^^Infl->^g->-.PaliDL..Springs Alpine 
£s££±£S^In£., 427 P.2d 805f 808, 59 Cal.Rptr. 141 (1967), the Court 
cited the well-settled rule that the misrepresentation of even a 
single material fact upon which plaintiff had a right to, and did, 
rely will support a judgment for fraud. S&& £l££ Callahan .v^  Wolfe, 
400 P.2d 938, 944 (Idaho, 1965). 
C. THE DEFENDANT EITHER KNEW THAT SUCH REPRESENTATIONS WERE 
FALSE OR MADE THEM IN RECKLESS DISREGARD AS TO THEIR TRUTH 
OR FALSITY. 
Scienter is a requisite element in a cause of action for 
fraud. Sugarhouse^Finance Company v .^Anderson, 610 P.2d at 1373; 
Taylor..g^Gaaarf 607 P.2d at 294. 
Harry Heathman Inc. knew that the 1979 Buick Regal which it 
sold to Harlen Brown was a used vehicle. The evidence showed that 
Heathman had loaned/leased the car to the BYU athletic department 
and that it had been driven by the BYU athletic director. (Record 
at 27). Therefore, Heathman's oral and written representations to 
Harlen Brown stating that the vehicle was new were false and 
Heathman Inc. knew the same. 
In Ismn-^£Qlin±LY^S^X2l£L~2lmQU£h ,V» PQEtet, 464 P.2d 815f 
11 Ariz.App. 369 (1970)f the Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed 
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the trial court judgment of an automobile buyer in his cause of 
action for fraud against the dealer. The Plaintiff bought a car 
with an odometer reading of 2f000 miles. It was determined that the 
mileage was actually 7f000 miles. The Court found that knowledge of 
the falsity of the representation could properly be imputed to the 
dealer, making proof of actual knowledge unnecessary. 
In a similar case in Colorado/ Karan v. Bob Post, Inc., 521 
P.2d 1276 (Colo.App. 1974) , it was undisputed that the salesman made 
a false representation regarding the mileage of the automobile. The 
court rejected his lack of knowledge as a defense to fraud. Citing 
StimBon^v., Helps, 9 Colo. 33f 10 P. 290, the Court stated: 
1
 . . . He who makes a representation as to his own 
knowledge, not knowing whether it be true or false, and it 
is in fact untrue, is guilty of fraud as much as if he knew 
it to be untrue. In such a case he acts to his own 
knowledge falsely, and the law imputes a fraudulent intent.1 
(Emphasis in original). 
In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d at 1246 this Court held that 
circumstances impose upon a real estate vendor a "special duty to 
know the truth of his representations." The Court continued, at p. 
1246, as follows: 
Where the nature of the situation is such [that] the vendor 
is presumed to know the facts to which his representation 
relates, a misrepresentation is fraudulent even though not 
made knowingly, willfully or with actual intent to deceive. 
An automobile dealer and its agents occupy a position 
similar to that of vendors of real estate. Both have knowledge, or 
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access to knowledge, which is not readily ascertainable or 
accessible to the buyer of a car or land. The circumstances impose 
a special duty upon a dealership to know the truth of its 
representations, and, in addition, the dealer is presumed to know 
the facts to which its representations relate. The agent for Harry 
Heathman, Inc. made material misrepresentations to Harlen Brown. 
Those misrepresentations, if made knowingly or in reckless disregard 
for their truth or falsity, were fraudulent. Because of the special 
duty of Harry Heathman, Inc. to know the truth of its 
representations, and because of the legitimate presumption that 
Harry Heathman, Inc. knew the facts on which its representations 
were based, the misrepresentations by Harry Heathman, Inc. were 
fraudulent. 
D. THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY DEFENDANT WERE MADE FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF INDUCING RELIANCE ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF, AND 
PLAINTIFF DID IN FACT REASONABLY RELY ON THE 
REPRESENTATIONS. 
In order to prove fraud, the material misrepresentations 
must have been made for the purpose of inducing reliance on the part 
of the other party and must have induced actual and justifiable 
reliance. sugarhQuae ,Einans£-,CaiDpan¥ s.» AndeisQPf 610 P.2d at 1373; 
T a y l o r v . ^ G a s o r , 607 P.2d a t 294 . 
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The oral and written representations by Harry Heathman, Inc. 
to Harlen Brown that the 1979 Buick Regal was a new vehicle may only 
be construed as having been made for the purpose of inducing 
reliance by Harlen Brown. Harlen Brown entered the Defendant's 
showroom intending to buy a new car. (Record at 27). The 
Defendant's agent knew of Harlen Brown's intent. Harry Heathman, 
Inc. represented orally and in writing that the car being considered 
by Harlen Brown was a new one and thereby met Plaintiff's 
requirements. The representations could have been made to serve no 
purpose other than inducing Mr. Brown to purchase the automobile. 
In Town_& Country Chrysler Plymouth v.. Porter. 464 P.2d at 
817, after refusing to set aside the Plaintiff's verdict for fraud 
against the Defendant dealer, the Court stated: 
. . . The Plaintiff certainly had a right to rely on the 
mileage representation, (citation omitted), and where, as 
here, the representor has a motive of monetary gain, the 
jury would be justified in finding an intent that the 
purchaser rely upon the representation, (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, if the jury found that the mileage 
representation was intended to cause the Plaintiff to act in 
reliance thereon, it could infer the requisite intent to 
deceive. 
In the instant case, the element of reliance is unequivocal. 
Mr. Brown purchased the 1979 Buick Regal based on Harry Heathman, 
Inc.'s oral and written representations that the automobile was new. 
Mr. Brown testified at the trial of this case that he would not have 
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purchased the automobile had he known it was a used vehicle. 
(Record at 24, 25). 
Mr. Brown's reliance on Harry Heathman, Inc.'s 
representations that the 1979 Buick Regal was a new car was 
undoubtedly reasonable. A prospective purchaser entering an 
automobile dealership is certainly entitled to rely on the dealer's 
representations of the specifications of the automobile being 
purchased. The dealer is in a superior position to know the facts 
regarding the automobile. The purchaser has no independent source 
of knowledge regarding the automobile. The buyer, therefore, 
frequently has no alternative but to rely on the representations 
made by the dealer. 
In Gheever v>, Schramm, Utah, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (1978), this 
Court held that: 
Although it is correct that a party is not required to 
independently ascertain the truth of every representation 
made in a transaction such as this one, one claiming fraud 
must show he acted reasonably under the circumstances . . . 
In determining [reasonableness], factors such as the 
respective age, intelligence, experience, mental condition, 
and knowledge of each party should be considered, along wit! 
their access to information, and the materiality of the 
representations. 
An automobile dealership unquestionably possesses more 
experience in auto sales, greater knowledge relating to the specific 
automobile involved, and superior access to information than does a 
consumer buyer. Mr. Brown is a truck driver (Record at 23) and 
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testified that he was tired when he entered the dealership as he had 
just returned from a delivery "run," (Record at 7). The relative 
position of the parties in the instant case and consideration of the 
circumstances requires a finding that Harlen Brown reasonably relied 
on the material misrepresentations of fact made by Harry Heathman, 
Inc. 
This Courtf in Dugan.v.. Jones, 615 P.2d at 1247 held: 
. . . a vendee of real property, in the absence of facts 
putting him on noticef has no duty to investigate to 
determine whether the vendor has misrepresented the area 
conveyed. Neither is a vendee estopped from recovering for 
misrepresentation of the area of the land conveyed merely 
because he viewed or inspected the premisesf so long as he 
did not endeavor to determine independently the exact 
quantity of land. Nor is a vendee estopped from recovering 
in an action for deceit because he had the opportunity to 
inspect or otherwise check the property prior to purchase. 
In the instant casef thereforef Harlen Brown is not 
precluded from recovery by any contention that he was deficient in 
failing to make an independent determination of the mileage 
registered on the automobile. To the contrary, Mr. Brown acted 
reasonably in relying on the Defendant's representations that the 
car was "new." 
E. HARLEN BROWN SUSTAINED DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANT'S 
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT 
It is essential that Plaintiff have sustained damages in a 
cause of action for fraud. Dilworth vA .Lauritzen. Utahf 424 P.2d 
13 
136f 138 (1967); Child v. Hayward, Utah 400 P.2d 758, 759 (1965). 
Harlen Brown entered into a written agreement to purchase 
the "new" 1979 Buick Regal for $ 9f123.64. Mr. Brown traded in his 
1978 Chevrolet truck as a down payment in the amount of $ 4,473.64. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 & 2 at trial). When he discovered that 
the Buick was not new, Mr. Brown attempted to rescind the contract 
buy returning the car to Harry Heathman, Inc. and obtaining the 
return of his truck. (Record at 19f 22 & 23). Harry Heathman, Inc, 
would not cooperate. Mr. Brown did not make payments on the Buick 
and Harry Heathman, Inc. repossessed it. (Record at 20,21). Mr. 
Brown traded in his truck, which he owned free and clear, on a used 
car which he was told was "new" and which was repossessed, and was 
left by Harry Heathman, Inc. without either vehicle. The 
substantial damage to Mr. Brown is obvious. 
Utah law requires that trial court findings be "supported b^  
substantial evidence." Hidden Meadows^Development Company.v^Milis 
Utah, 590 P.2d 1244, 1250 (1979). 
The trial court's findings in the instant case that 
Defendant had not committed fraud against the Plaintiff is not 
supported by "substantial" evidence. Rather, the ruling is against 
the clear weight of the evidence supporting fraud. The judgment of 
the trial court, therefore, must be reversed. 
14 
?. THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY UNCHALLENGED 
BY THE DEFENDANT. THE ONLY ATTEMPT BY DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL 
TO CHALLENGE PLAINITFF'S EVIDENCE WAS THROUGH THE OFFER OF 
THE DEPOSITION OF ONE ROBERT H. POSEY AS EVIDENCE. THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF PORTIONS OF THE 
DEPOSITION WAS ERROR IN THE ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE SHOWING 
OF LEGAL UNAVAILABILITY OF POSEY AS A WITNESS. 
Rule 804(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the 
conditions upon which out-of-court deposition testimony (hearsay) is 
admissible as substantive evidence at trial. The rule states: 
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which 
the declarant 
(1) is exempted by . . . privilege; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify . . .; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory . . .; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing 
because of death or then existing physical or mental 
illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his 
statement has been unable to procure his attendance 
by process or other reasonable means. 
In Madrid v. .Scholea, 546 P.2d 863 (N.M.App. 1976), the 
defendant's attorney sought to introduce previous testimony of two 
witnesses who were not present at the trial. On their absencef the 
defendant's attorney commentedf "Subpoenas were sentf I don't have a 
return by these - - -." The trial court admitted the former 
testimony. Concerning part (5) of the Rulef the Court of Appeals of 
New Mexico reversed the trial court's admission of former testimony 
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into evidence and recited the requirement of Rule 804(a)(5) that th< 
party show "that he was unable to procure the attendance of the 
witness by process or other reasonable means/' (p. 865). The Court 
of Appeals held that the defendant did not comply with the Rule. 
In the present case, counsel for Heathman, Inc. offered as 
evidence portions of the deposition of Robert H. Posey. (Record at 
34). Said counsel did not call any witnesses or attempt to put on 
any other evidence. Upon the objection of Brown's counsel, the 
court inquired into the availability of Mr. Posey. Heathman's 
counsel replied, 
"He is [unavailable], your Honor. We have been unable to 
locate him. Mr. Heathman does not know where he's at. Mr. 
Heathman doesn't have any employee around anymore except fo 
Walt Farmer. Mr. Parmer does not know where Mr. Posey is, 
either. . . no service of a subpoena has been attempted 
because we didn't even have an address for him to even try 
that." (Record at 34, 35). 
Plaintiff's counsel objected on the ground that the proffer 
by Defendant's counsel did not satisfy the requisite showing that 
attendance of the witness had been attempted "by process or other 
reasonable means". Judge Bullock noted that Heathman's attorney he 
orally represented that the witness was unavailable, and asked 
Brown's attorney if more than that was required. (Record at 35). 
Plaintiff's attorney responded in the affirmative and reserved his 
right to further objection. (Record at 35). Later, Plaintiff's 
attorney renewed his objection to the admission of the Posey 
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deposition on the ground that there had been inadequate proof of 
legal unavailability of the witness. (Record at 48). Judge Bullock 
overruled the objection and ruled that Defendant's attorney had met 
the required showing of unavailability under Rule 804. (Record at 
48 & 51). He stated that Rule 804 did not require the 
issuance of a summons [sic], when the proponent of the 
defendant [sic] doesn't know where the summons [sic] can be 
served or has made some reasonable effort, which he says he 
hasf to ascertain the whereabouts of the deposer [sic]. 
(Record at 51). 
The Judge ruled that the deposition testimony was admissible 
under Rule 804(b). (Record at 51). Rule 804(b) presupposes a 
determination of declarant unavailability as defined in Rule 804(a). 
The Judge's reliance upon 804(b) wasf thereforef inappropriate. 
In Madrid, the Defendant's attorney attempted service of 
subpoenas on the absent witnesses which the Court held to be an 
inadequate attempt to secure their attendance. In the instant case, 
Defendant's attorney did not even attempt service of a subpoena to 
procure the attendance of Mr. Posey. 
The only evidence of declarant unavailability in this case 
was the oral conclusion by Defendant's attorney that the witness was 
"unavailable." (Record at 34 & 35). Under the clear language of 
Rule 804(a), and the guidance of Madrid, that is a wholly 
insufficient showing of declarant unavailability. Therefore, the 
District Court's admission into evidence of the deposition of Robert 
H. Posey was error. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE A FINDING ON THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT IS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with 
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, . . . 
This Court unequivocally restated this principle in, and 
remanded for more definite findings, the case of Silliman v* 
Powell, Utah, 642 P.2d 388, 391 (1982) as follows: 
As the determiner of fact, the trial court is required to 
make findings on all material issues. 
The Court likewise remanded for more definite findings the case of 
Rucker v. Dalton, Utah, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1979) and explained 
its reasons for the requirement as follows: 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings 
of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the 
resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law. To that 
end, findings should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
In £QiliJ^II^^_ZiflD^£ixai^^atiQnftl .Bank, Utah, 611 P.2d 392, 394-95 
(1980), this Court quoted Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., and continued: 
This requirement is mandatory and may not be waived. . . . 
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material 
issues is reversible error. 
18 
S&& also Bayer v. Lignell,. Utah, 567 P.2d 1112f 1113 (1977). 
The Plaintiff pled (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, 
paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 13f & 14) and argued (Record at 71, 72, 73 & 78) 
a cause of action for breach of contract. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered by the Honorable J. Robert Bullock state 
only that Plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for fraud, 
and indeed fail to even mention a contract cause of action. The 
absence of a finding on Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of 
contract and the strong statements of this Court requiring findings 
on all issues mandate the reversal of the lower court decision on 
this issue. 
gfllMT III 
DEFENDANT'S REPOSSESSION OF THE 1979 BUICK REGAL AND 
RETENTION OF THE 1978 CHEVROLET TRUCK CONSTITUTE UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT. 
An established maxim of equity jurisprudence is that of 
unjust enrichment. On this topic 30 C.J.S. Equity Sec. 89 states 
in part: 
One must not enrich himself at the expense of another; and 
equity seeks to prevent unjust enrichment, and will not 
permit one to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of 
another. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tgxag_.CQ^y^MJLIler, 
165 F.2d 111, 114-15 (5th Cir. 1947), states as follows: 
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. • . Equity does not look with favor on the unjust 
enrichment of one person at the expense of another and will 
generally exercise its offices either by applying the 
principle of subrogation or by declaring the existence of a 
constructive trust or of an equitable lien in prevention 
thereof. 
In E*L*.,Bl»CS.S&*^jt-3La&l&2~hUlDb2JL^Q^~Q£^tetenatt, 79 
F.Supp. 176, 189 (D.C.W.D. Ark. 1948), the Court repeated the 
familiar principle as follows: 
. . . equity will not permit one to unjustly enrich himself 
at the expense of another. . . . 
After Harlen Brown rescinded his contract to purchase the 
1979 Buick Regal, Harry Heathman, Inc. repossessed the Regal. 
(Record at 20, 21). Heathman, Inc. refused Brown's requests to 
return his trade-in vehicle, the 1978 Chevrolet truck. (Record at 
19, 22, & 23). As a result, Heathman, Inc. possessed the 1979 Buick 
Regal or proceeds from its subsequent re-sale, and the 1978 
Chevrolet truck or proceeds from its subsequent re-sale. Such 
retention of both vehicles constitutes unjust enrichment by 
Heathman, Inc. 
CQNCmSIQfl 
The District Court erred in its ruling that Plaintiff had 
not established a cause of action for fraud and erred in failing to 
make a ruling on Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract 
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and unjust enrichment. The judgment of the lower court must, 
therefore, be reversed. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIELDS, SHIELDS & HOLMGREN 
M^V<wVX -1~W U^> 
Randall J. rtoMgren 
Attorney fon Appellant 
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GARY L. CHRYSTL. • 
Attorney for Defendants 
42 North University Ave. 
Suite 4, P.O. Box 1045 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 375-3121 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
— o o o O o o o ™ 
HARLEN W. BROWN, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- : 
Civil No. 52,832 
HARRY HEATHMAN, INC.; HARRY : 
HEATHMAN d/b/a HEATHMAN INVESTMENT 
COMPANY; and HEATHMAN PROPERTIES, : 
Defendants. 
—-oooOooo—-
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 13th day of May, 1985. 
Plaintiff was represented by Randall J. Holmgrem and Defendants were 
represented by Gary L. Chrystler. As a preliminary matter, Defendant, Harry 
Heathman Inc., indicated, by and through counsel, that it would not prosecute 
its Counterclaim and the same was dismissed. Plaintiff was sworn and testified 
concerning the allegations in his Complaint and in support of his cause of 
action against the Defendants. At the request of Plaintiff's counsel, portions 
of the Deposition of Robert H. Posey, salesman for Harry Heathman Inc., were 
published and admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of evidence the 
matter was taken under advisement by the Court. Having reviewed the testimony 
and evidence submitted and heard the arguments and being fully advised in 
the premises, the Court now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendants1 Counterclaim is dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
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2. Plaintiff, Harlen W. Brown, is a resident of Glenrock, Wyoming. 
3. Harry Heathman Inc., is a Utah Corporation licensed to do business 
in the state of Utah. 
4. Harry Heathman is a resident of the state of Utah. 
5. On or about September 12, 1979, Harlen W. Brown was the owner of a 
1978 Chevrolet automobile. 
6. On or about September 12, 1979, Harry Heathman Inc., sold Plaintiff 
a 1979 Buick Regal automobile for the total sum of $12,175.72. 
7. Plaintiff traded in his 1978 Chevrolet automobile and received a 
credit as a down payment therefor in the sum of $4,473.64. 
8. The balance of the contract purchase price of $5,915*44 was financed 
over a period of 48 months at an annual interest rate of 13.30 percent. 
9. Pursuant to the parties1 agreement, on September 12, 1979, Plaintiff 
executed a Vehicle Buyer's Order which indicated that the vehicle purchased 
by him was a new 1979 Buick Regal and that it had an outgoing odometer readin 
of 11,946 miles. 
10. Also on September 12, 1979, to facilitate financing, Plaintiff 
executed a Conditional Sales Contract and Security Agreement which indicated 
the vehicle he was purchasing from Harry Heathman Inc., was a new 1979 Buick 
Regal automobile. 
11. After purchase of the 1979 Buick Regal , Plaintiff brought suit 
against Defendants for recision of the purchase contract claiming Defendants 
had fraudulently induced the purchase by knowingly and falsely misrepresents 
the fact that the 1979 Buick Regal had been a driver's training car. 
12. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof regarding allegations 
of fraud in that Plaintiff failed to convince the Court that Defendant, Harr 
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Heathman Inc., or any of its employees or authorized agents knowingly made 
false statements to Plaintiff regarding the character of the automobile 
purchased nor did Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or any of its authorized 
agents or employees by their acts fraudulently induce Plaintiff into purchasing 
the 1979 Buick Regal. 
13. Plaintiff also failed to meet his burden of proof regarding establish-
ing by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or 
any of its authorized agents or employees acted with scienter in this matter. 
14. Plaintiff, Harlen W. Brown, has therefore, failed to establish his 
cause of action by failing to convince the Court by clear and convincing eviden 
that the Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or any of its authorized agents or 
employees committed actual acts of fraud in this transaction nor did Harry 
Heathman Inc. or any of its authorized employees or agents commit any deceptive 
act or practice which would support recision of the parties purchase and sale 
contract. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Counterclaim of the Defendants is hereby dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed for no cause of action 
against all Defendants. 
3. No costs are awarded either party. 
DATED this day of , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. ftOdERT 6 U L L 0 C K — 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
175 North 100 West 
HARRY HEAThMAN, INC. 
PROVO UTAH 84601 
CHEVROLET BUICK OPEL LUV 
VEHICLE BUYER'S ORDER 
|( CRi c SALE—D'SCLOSURE S T A T E M E N T 
Telephone 373-9500 ! - 1 r " h Prl<* 
2 Downimyment Consisting of 
A Cash Downpayment 
O rotal Down payment (2 A & B) 
DATE OF ORDER W -
BUYER J \^r,\^^\ 
ADDRESS j r m js^. 
^ - T H 
Ok \ i V i. 
\ ?D C 
*-*-"" ' . 
I 
3 Unpaid BaUnce of f i s h Price (1 -2C) j 
4 Othfr C h a r t s Cunss intr of 
•A l)\tu 1 Pi y cal 
DamuKe rn« i anee % 
CITY v - ^ C ^ COUNTY 
J _ / . ^ j r A STATE AND i"- , > - P
w O \ f f 
ZIP CODE ^A t r V O ^ 
I hereby order from you, subject to all terms conditions and agreements contained 
herein, and the ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS printed on the reverse sid» hereof 
the following 
6 NEW D USED VEHICLE 
D sahihty Ins J 
D Sales THN $ 
F Licpnw Transfer QJ TXlSCS 
Total Other Chnrjres 
4A B C I> > 
Lnpa 1 BAI incc (Amount 
Financed) 1 -r At) 
YEAR ^ MAKE r>,«,... j Q , ^ MODEL JfiaC U 6. FINANCE CHARGE 
TYPE 
STOCK NO < 
COLOR
 t < ^ i U >L^ ->L SERIAL N Q i ^ j w ^ 
Cash Selling Price 
1XL 
< --v 
TO BE DELIVERED ON OR ABOL"^ 
X1IQ. Defeired Payment Price (1 -4- 4F -
3 Total of Payment! ( 
l $ O l 
Optional Equipment or Services Total Installed Pricei $ 
1
 . . .r-tC... *VL. 
. ^ -*C« ^ u - , ^ r ^ 
|* |$ 
i . 
1 ' 
0*3 
^5£J 
«.,; 
^ i 
' ^ O O A T - ,$ f ^r r y > j 
Total fpT optional equipment ard /r - services ;o~C>,c-..>^ 
>^ub Total 
Less ahowance for mv * ^^ff" 
^
 s(Model) 
1
 iBody Styled 
^ ^ (^ii \e*r ^»i ie i \ £ .
 t 
(Serial No ) 
(Deduc Prom 
With equipment as appraised subT i n 
AMOL \ , r n SUBJECT TO <ALES TAX 
Sales Tax , 
License and Transfer of Title 
Total Cash Selling Price 
TRADE IN ALLOWANCE 
Less Balance Owing to 
Cash Due on Delivery 
Total Down Payment 
Unpaid Cash Price Balance 
Total Tnsuranee Premium QQrAVArQi -
Property Tax on Trade-m 
Net Allowance (Which allowance I guarantee 
free from all encumbrances ) 
Deposit Herewith 
Additional Informat on P"^.*"?" C O D t \QU(** 
^ A N N U A L PERCENTAGE PATE % 
10 Finance charges to begin acciue on 
11 TOT \L OF PAYMENTS shall be repaid 
to SELLER m consecutive installments 
of S each on the day of each 
rronth beginning , 19 , PLUS $ 
on , 19 X , and $ . 
on ,19 X 
If any installment is more than twice the 
amount of an j^herwise regular \ scheduled 
equal w* ment it is a BALLOON PAYMENT 
u tich tray be refinanced without pena ty. 
Ix^ntify each "BALLOON PAYMENT" at 
"X" above. 
12 If any installment is in defau't more than 10 days, 
default cnarges shall be oavab o n the amount of 57c 
of the H mqut nt nstallment or $5, whicn^ver is less, 
or at s«. crs eifct on an amount equal *o >~e annual 
percentage rate statnd above t rie>. +*\e u lD^id amount 
o
f
 the installment from tne c I date of the install-
ment until paid n full, counting each day as l/30th 
of a month 
14 If this contract is prepaid, a refund credit com-
nutec n acor^ ncc with the rule o> 73s v»i I be made 
to Buytr, sun c fo retention ov seller of a minimum 
financt charge jf $5 il fne mount financed does not 
exceed ^75, or S7 50 l «niount financed exceeds 
$75 No rebate will oe made if the amount thereot 
is 'ess than SI 
4A PHYSICAL DAMAGE INSURANCE against 
accidental damage to the Property ror a term oi 
months i^ checked G Comprenensive Coverage 
G Fire Thet* and Additional Coverage 
G $ Deductible Coll sion 
• Towing and Labor insurance settlement will be 
based upon actual casn vame of Property at time oi 
loss not exceeding ' nuts of lability set forth in 
pol cy, and payaoit to Buyer, Seller or Assignee of 
Seller, as interests may appear 
BL YER MAY CHOOSE THE PFRSON THROUGH 
WHICH THE INSURANCE IS ~ ^ OBT \INED 
**4B & C CREDI^ LIFE AND/OR " ^ A B I L I T Y 
INSURANCE according to *erms and conditions set 
forth m policy or certificate if insurance issued by 
NAME INSURER 
HOME OFFICE 
ADDRESS 
* ^ ) Z > 6 d Q . S ' l IF CHARGE FOR CREDIT LIFF AND/OR DISA-
CUSTOMER TO < ORNISH OWN COLLISION AND LIABILITY | BILITY INSURANCE, IS TO V_ .NCLUDED 'N 
INSURANCE AND ACCEPTS FULL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY i 
FOR DAMAGE DUE TO COLLISION 
NOTICE TO CUSTOMER" I HAVE BEEN MA HE NO PROMISES 
BY HARRY HEATHMA.N INC REPRESENTATIVES NOT LISTED 
IN THIS CONTRACT OTHER THAN REPAIR ORDER AS TO 
ACCESSORIES, FREE WORK, OR ANY ITEM NOT LISTED ON 
THIS CONTRACT WARRANTIES TYPE NO I 
HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS CONTRACT FULLY 
BUYERS SIGNATURE X 
ORDER, INSERT CHARGE i\T LINE 4B & C 
AMD ^AVF BUYER AND CO BUYER SIGN 
THIS STATEMENT BEFORE SIGNING ORDER 
BELOW 
BUYER IS NOT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN CREDIT 
LIFE AND/OR DISAS'LIT' INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
MANAGER DISCLOSING THIS CONTRACT X 
Salesman \ 7^%^ &zY 
APPROVED BY 
THIS ORDER IS NOT VALID UNLESS SIGNED 
AS ACCEPTED H E ^ E BY SALESMANAGER 
OR OFFICER OF ^ H E COMPANY 
The undersigned hereby affirm (s) that the charge 
for credit life and/or disability insurance shown in 
item 4B & C of *his Disclosure Statement h * been 
disclosed m writing (o the u <^t r igned prior o exe-
cution H\ 'he under*> pned of this statement and that 
after suth disclosure fne undersigned specifica j af-
firm(s) that the unuf-rs gned u w r e K to ootam * e 
insurance for whicn a^ amount is included aoove 
BUYER'S 
SIGNATURE X 
DATE 
CO-BUYER'S 
SIGNATURE X 
DATE 
NOTICE TO THE BL^cER Do not sign this order before you read it or if it contains any •>' ink spaces in the CREDIT SALE DIS-
CLOSURE STATEMENT portion hereof if credit is extended You are entitled to an exact couv of *he order you si(?-> 
3UYER ACKNOWLEDGES he has read and -ece ved a complete copy of this order comprising «he entire igreementjiffet' this purchase 
\ Buyer Signs 7 B Co Buyer Signs 
x " -y / v j , /'«^<f>-~^ x 
CONDITIONS 
I T is FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED: 
The order on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms and conditions which have been mutually agreed upon/ 
1. The manufacturer has reserved the right to change the list price of new motor vehicles without notice and In the event ihat the list price of the 
new vehicle ordered hereunder is so changed, the cash delivered price, which Is based on list price effective on the day of delivery, will govern 
r this transaction. But if such cash delivered price is increased tne buyer may, if dissatisfied w»th such irceased price, cancel this order, in 
which evant if a used vehicle has been traded in as a part of the consideration herein, such used vehicle sha i be r«i-j; ;ed to the buyer upon the, 
payment of a reasonable charge for storage and repairs (if any) or, if the used vehicle nas csen previously soid by vr\$ dealer, the amount 
received therefor, less a selling commission of 15% and any expense Incurred in storing, insuring, conditioning or advertising said vehicle for 
sale,.shall be returned to the buyer. 
2. The buyer agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery o* such vehicle in the 
•f same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear excepted, and the buyer warrants such used 
vehicle to be his property free and clear of all lien and encumbrances except as otherwise noted herein. .... 
3. Upon the failure or refusal of the buyer to complete said purchase for any reason other than cancellation on account of increase in price, the 
cash deposit may be retained as liquidated damages, or in the event a used vehicle nar> &*»r, taken in trade, the buyer hereby authorizes dealer 
to sell said used vehicle, and the dealer shall be entitled to reimburse himself out of me proceeds of such sale, for the expenses specified in 
paragraph 1 above and also for his expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of buyer's failure to ccmpiete said purchase. 
4v The manufacturer has the right to make any changes in the model or design of any accessories and part of any new motor vehicle at any time 
without creating any obligation on the part of either the Dealer or the Manufacturer, to rnuice corresponding changes in the venicle coverec by 
this order either before or subsequent to tne delivery of such vehicle to the buyer. 
5. Dealer shall not be liable for delays caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond the control of the dealer. 
6. ' NO WARRANTIES ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER THE DEALER OR THE MANUFACTURER OF 
THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHAS$:$ FURNISHED HEREUNDER, EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED 
WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HERF.iN AND MADE A 
PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHiCH WILL BE DELIVERED TO BUYER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW V10T0R VEHICLE 
OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY QTHEP WARRANTY EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE. AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL 8E TH£ ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY PERSON 
WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS. 
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,-ARE MADESY THE DEALER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR MOTOR 
VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT A 5 \--AY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING 3Y THE DEALER FOR SUCH USED 
MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND 
MADE A PART HEREOF. ' 
" 7 . Jn case jhe vehicle covered by this order is a used vehicle, no warranty or representation is made as to the extent such vehicle has been used, 
. / ' • ' * regaraiess of.the mileage shown on the speedometer of said used venicje. 
&. In the event that the transaction referred to in this order is not a cash transaction, the buyer herein, before or at the time of delivery of the 
vehicle ordered, and in accordance with the terms and conditions of payments indicated cs the front of this order, will executs a conditional 
sales contract, or such other form of security agreement as may be required to complete tnis transaction upon a time credit price :,asis. 
9. - In the event that it becomes necessary for Dealer to enforce any of tha terms and conditions of this order, buyer agrees to pay reasonable 
> r
 attorney's fees and court costs. 
10 . . .Th is order is Non-Transferable. •« ~? *j} y *"*" / / & G 
11: ' This order is subject to .credit approval by a financing institution, and in the event it is unacceptable to the financing institution, buyer will 
•j-i T i <return vehicle covered by this order immediately to Deasar rf delivery has been made. 
1 2 1 ; X L I A B I L I T Y INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED ;N THIS ; 
. AGREEMENT. i ^ A A . , • - ; : . - ,v ' ; - .... ' \ A ' *A'': • _ . ,_,./,.. • " ••«" A . , , - . -A ' '" 
13. BUYER REPRESENTS he Is 18 years of age or older, and no credit has been extended except as appears on the reverse side. 
14. * This order constitutes the entire terms and agreements between the. parties hereto in reference to the vehicle ordered hereunder. 
G.n«r,lMowstaptaK,cental* * 0 » Z 5 3 7 3 , f A L l TAKE CITY. t'TAH 8fc*_* 
Address 
is a*3 edttor tr* this credit sale transaction solely for the disclosure purposes of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 
Buyer (and Co Bjyer)—Name and Address (Include—County ard Z*p Code) 
BA3XEN W BROWN 
124 H 130 B 
0RSM,,U7 84057 
Seller—Name and Address 
PARRY RSATUMAN^INC. 
175 SORTH 100 WEST 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
The seller hereby sells, and the buyer (meaning all undersigned buyers, jointly and severally) hereby purchases, subject to the terms set forth below and upon the n m •> side hereof, 
+he following property, delivery and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowledged by buyer, viz.-
[ New or Used (Year Model [ No.Cyl. 
SET? 1979 8 
Make Trade Name 
BUTCK 
If truck—Describe bodies 3rd major items of equipment sold— 
Body Type — If Truck, Give GVW 
tm o 
Model No. or Series 
HSGAL 
J Venic'e identification No. l 
1 
1 4M47V92126640 
Buyer represents" that the purchase of said property is primarily for personal, fam ly or household fjJv agricultural D , business (other than agricultural* ""' use (check one). 
1. CASH PRICE (including any accessories, services and taxes imposed on the cash sale) . 9 * 3 7 . 3 A 6 4 . • SALES. .TAX 2 3 ? . V , 6 0 6 » 3 9 t\) 
2. TOTAL DOWAYMENT-Trade-in1223. CHSV % 4 . 4 7 3 . 6 4 - $ MOWK j , 4 , 4 7 3 . 6 4
 pi„s % _ BPKS $ 4 , 4 7 3 . 6 4 m 
Make, Model, Year Gross Trade-in (Payoff - made by ' Trade-in (Net) Cash Downpayment 
Allowance seller) 
3. UNPAID BALANCE OF CASH PRICE (Pifference between Items 1 and 2) $ _ J J L 1 2 2 - - J ! L ( 3 ) 
4. OTHER CHARGES 
*A. Cost of Required Physical Damage Insurance -
* * 8 . Cost of Optional Mechanical Breakdown Insurance 
BUYER MAY CHOOSE THE PERSON THROUGH WHICH THE INSURANCE IN A AND B IS TO BE OBTAINED. 
C Cost of Creditor Insurance for the *er <• iereof. 
COVERAGE OF THE BUYER BY ANY SUCH iNStP^CE IS NOT REQUIRED BY SELLER. 
CHECK CRESiTOi *** 2 X L u e S t * 3 G L £ . . . . . v 
I N I V I A X C E O I $ I * E O {^Disability (Acadent ami Health) 
Q Other (describe) $, 
BUYER'S APPROVAL: I DESIRE TO OBTAIN THE CREDITOR INSURANCE CHECKED ABOVE FOR THE BUYER PROPOSED FOR INSURANCE. 
*-
WHS f4A) 
S O K E (48) 
300 ,35 (Ata 
J 2 L L H - ( 4 O 
_ J ^ S - ( 4 C ) 
J 9 / 1 2 / 7 . 3 . 
(Oate) 
swr— M^Jlx. \<.rr (Co-Buyer's Signature) 
Ua?5,(4D) 
?.«Q (4E) 
_ ~ * I H L { 4 F > 
?*0.flft fir.) 
(Buyer's Signature} 
D OfKra! Fees (Describe)... SAFETY.. IHS.. 5*25..BGC..EEB 7..30. 1 
E. License and/or Registration Fees (Itemize) 5. 
F. Certificate of Title Fee S. 
G. Other (Descnbe) MUC.SER¥IGS.CQSr»ACT..3l6/5a,0(H). 1 
5. UNPAID BALANCE-AMOUNT FINANCED (Sum of .terns 3 and 4) - % 5*2il*j£iL(5) 
6. F I N A N C E C H A R G E $ l^lteJ&j® 
7. TOTAL OF PAYMENTS (Sum of 'ems 5 and 6) *. $. 7 .» .702. 03,(7) 
3. DEFERRED^ PAYMENT PRICE (Sum of items 1,4 and 6) $_Jj2jJLZlt_77_(3) 
9. AHNUAl PERCENTAGE RATE 13 .30 % <$ 
1% PAYMENT SCHEDULE: The Total o* Payments (Item 7) >s payab'e tf se'ler's ofice design ted be'ow or a* sud office of any assise* s ^ay be her '*&• des gnated m 4 * * 
insta'ments of $ l£k£L££each f commenang - - J J 1 L 2 2 2 2 2 , 1? , anc -r '^ same day of each success^ i .ci* i ^ereaner y s mdicated 
m space below. 
Any instalment which is more than t*ice the amount of an otherwise 'egu ar'y scheduled equal instalment s > 3ALL00N PAYMENT Unl oS the property de«cnaed »n this contact is 
to oe used primarily for agricultural or leasing purposes, bayer has *he «• ?ht *o rv • <>nce the amount of any da loon °ayment at the tirrs it <$ due -v.tnoui per. *y and under te^3 
, * whici shall be no less favorable to the buyer than trs terms of the origins sale. T 'ese provisions do not app'y to the extent that the Paymen* Schedule is adjusted to f e *eason3. 
~~ or irregulaf income of the buyer, 
U . . DEFAULT CHARGE IN EVENT OF UATE PAYMENT If any msta'ment is not paid wMm 10 days after it is due, buyer agrees to pay a delmauency charge equal to 5% of the unpa.d .nstalment 
not to eiczzd $3 if property hereunder is purchased onmar 'y 'or personal, far ly, lousehoid or agnciutura' use. 
12 DESCRIPTION OF SECURITY INTEREST Seller retains a security interest under the o form Commercia' Code T the O'ooerty described above anc any proceeds to secure payment and 
performance of buyer $.obkgatiou hereunder, including any adoitional indeotedness incurred as providea *erem and uncer any eittensions or renewals hereof 
13. PREPAYMENT REBATE Upon prepayment in full buyer is entitled to a rebate of the Finance Charge (Item 6) comouted ir accordancew,tn t>,e py e of ™ * the obligation hereunder is 
onginaily payable in 61 instalments or less, otherwise m accordance w.th the ac*uana' method A rmmmun -rge wilt Ji retained n <•" *s» arour i >he rebate as J 
tows- $5 if the Amount Financed does not exceed $75 $7.50 when tl-« Amount cmanced exceeds $75 *** *»:?^ e under $ 1 wil' -e paid. 
*Requsre«i ^jysscal Damage Insurance 
Insurance Company. Term: months 
Q t ., Deductible Collision—and also select one of the following* 
Q full Comprehensive mcludmg-FireT eft and Combined Add^ca! Coverage 
Q $ Deductib CuTiprehensive mcludmg-Fire-Theft and Comoined Additional Coverage 
**Opt»nal Wechanicai Breakdown Insurance 
Insurance Company _ _ J H C 
Term Q 36 months or 35-000 miles whichever ocurs first 
Term [ 1 M I C 3 4 / 5 0 0 0 0 
[2 $25 Deductible £ 550 Deductible £ ] $ Deductible r ] Fire-Theft and Combined Additional Coverage 
Optional if desired-Towing and Labor costs • Renta1 Reimbursement [2 
The insurance, If any, referred to in this contract does not include coverage for bodi'y injury and property damage caused *o others. 
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RULE 52 
FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with 
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to 
Rule 58A; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court 
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not neces-
sary for purposes of review. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the c,ourt. Findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under 
Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
RULE 804 
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations 
in which the declarant . • ••*:„„ 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying 
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement 
despite an order of the court to do HO; or 
(!)) tout Hies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then 
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(6) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable 
to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of 
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the propo-
nent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or 
testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the 
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in 
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the tes-
timony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, 
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or 
redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or 
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was 
imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(:i) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of Its making 
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended 
to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him 
against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the 
statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the de-
clarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible 
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the de-
clarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, 
adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history, 
even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the 
matter stated; or (8) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, 
of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or 
marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be likely to 
have accurate information concerning the matter declared. 
(6) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if 
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material 
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be 
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the 
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the state-
ment and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
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